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ABSTRACT 
 
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a debilitating condition that results from the 
experience of a traumatic event. Natural kinds are mind-independent entities found in nature and 
are the objects of scientific inquiry. It is common to deny that PTSD is a natural kind, but extant 
denials assume a thesis of natural kinds that can be called “essentialism”. According to 
essentialism, many entities are not natural kinds that one would expect should be natural kinds. 
The homeostatic cluster view of natural kinds offers an alternative that accommodates these cases, 
including, superficially, the claim that PTSD is a natural kind. I introduce two novel objections to 
this claim and recommend a distinction aimed to resolve the newly introduced problems. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a mental disorder that results as a response to the 
experience of a tragic, severe, and often life-threatening event, such as witnessing a natural 
disaster, wartime experience, or freak accident.1 It has been stated that, “…no other DSM 
diagnosis…has generated so much controversy in the field as to the boundaries of the disorder, 
diagnostic criteria, central assumptions, clinical utility, and prevalence in various populations.”2 
Some deny that PTSD is a legitimate diagnostic category.3 Others prescribe caution in its 
application or suggest various amendments to the diagnostic criteria of PTSD.4 Although I will 
have something to say about these disputes later in this thesis, they will not be my main focus 
here. 
My aim will be to answer a philosophical question concerning PTSD: Is PTSD is a 
natural kind? The answer to this question provides a framework within which to understand the 
problems that surround this controversial disorder. Briefly, natural kinds are categories of things 
that are found in nature, rather than products of mental construction.5 Water is a paradigmatic 
instance of a natural kind. Water was discovered, not created. “Fans of Miles Davis” do not 
                                                          
1 Cantor, Chris. Evolution and Posttraumatic Stress. London: Routledge, 2005. Yehuda, Rachel, and Joseph 
LeDoux. "Response Variation following Trauma: A Translational Neuroscience Approach to Understanding PTSD." 
Neuron 56 (2007): 19-32. 
2 Spitzer, Robert L., Michael B. First, and Jerome C Wakefield. "Saving PTSD from Itself in DSM-V." Journal of 
Anxiety Disorders, (2007): 233-241. 
3 McHugh, Paul R., and Treisman, Glenn. “PTSD: A problematic diagnostic construct.” Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 21, (2007): 211–222. 
4 Rosen, Gerald, and Steven Taylor. "Pseudo-PTSD." Journal of Anxiety Disorders, (2007): 201-210. Spitzer, 
Robert L., Michael B. First, and Jerome C Wakefield. "Saving PTSD from Itself in DSM-V." Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, (2007): 233-241. 
5 Boyd, Richard. "Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds." Philosophical Studies, 
(1991): 127-148. Samuels, Richard. "Delusions as a Natural Kind." In Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: 
Philosophical Perspectives , edited by M. Broome and L. Bortolotti. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming. 
The question, “What is a natural kind?” is answerable in various ways. For a semantic version of this answer, see 
Scott Soames, "What are Natural Kinds?," Philosophical Topics, Forthcoming. 
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constitute a natural kind category, as this is a result of mental interpretations. So is PTSD more 
like water or “Fans of Miles Davis”? This is the question I will pursue here.  
Paul Griffiths states the importance of natural kinds bluntly: “…natural kinds are 
categories about which we can make scientific discoveries.”6 I will go into further detail soon, 
but here are some briefly stated reasons that Griffiths offers in support of the claim that natural 
kinds are important for scientific practices. First, natural kinds justify inferential generalizations. 
A limited number of observed samples allow inferences to be ‘projected’ towards the larger class 
of which the samples are members. Moreover, categorization of particulars within scientific 
domains depends upon this justification. Also, natural kinds are important for science, as they 
provide targets for mechanistic explanation.7 One can explain the fact that water is wet at ideal 
temperatures by looking at the molecular structure of water. Thus, if PTSD is a natural kind, it 
would be possible to make scientific discoveries about PTSD. 
One way to deny that PTSD is a real disorder is to argue that PTSD is not a natural kind, 
and one could accomplish this by stating that there is nothing essential that all persons with 
PTSD share.8  Past arguments that deny the claim that PTSD is a natural kind proceed in exactly 
this way.9 I will show that these arguments are insufficient to demonstrate that PTSD is not a 
natural kind, as they rely upon an overly restrictive notion of natural kinds. Endorsing an 
alternative understanding of natural kinds offers a way to defend the thesis that PTSD is a natural 
kind. However, this understanding of natural kinds faces a pair of different challenges that are 
not discussed in the literature concerning PTSD. The first challenge stems from the fact that 
                                                          
6 Griffiths, Paul E. "Is Emotion a Natural Kind?" In Philosophers on Emotion, by Robert Solomon, 233-249. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. The next few points are due to Griffiths. 
7 Samuels, forthcoming. 
8 Much of what I state here in this paper is based upon Richard Samuels, forthcoming. For a similar discussion 
concerning the status of emotions as natural kinds, see Lisa Feldman Barrett, "Are Emotions Natural Kinds?," 
Perspectives on Psychological Science (Blackwell Publishing), 2006: 28-58; also, Griffiths, 2004. 
9 For example, see Allan Young, The Harmony Of Illusions - Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
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mental disorders qua disorders violate norms. Thus, in the case of PTSD, we might ask what 
norms have been violated. I will argue that the norms that the disorder PTSD violates are norms 
of rationality. If I am right, then the thesis that PTSD is a natural kind faces a difficult objection, 
as natural kinds are not subject to violations of rational norms. A second challenge is that 
diagnosis of mental disorders can affect the patient’s self-understanding. As a result, the patient’s 
disorder also changes, a phenomenon discussed by Ian Hacking that he calls the “looping 
effect.”10 It doesn’t seem right to say that natural kinds are susceptible to the looping effect; 
water does not change as a result of self-understanding. Thus, if PTSD patients are susceptible to 
the looping effect, this challenges the claim that PTSD is a natural kind. To deny PTSD is a 
natural kind generates a problem for this disorder, as one would like to say that PTSD is an 
object of scientific inquiry. I will offer a preliminary reconciliation of the problems I raise by 
suggesting that the definition of PTSD in the context of clinical practices and theoretical 
practices is different.  
Before I begin, I need to acknowledge two points. First, I will be referencing the 
diagnostic criteria of the American Psychological Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (DSM) as though it is definitional, although I recognize that there is a distinction 
between diagnostic criteria and definitions.11 Diagnostic criteria are intended for clinical 
applications, whereas definitions state what something is. One way of putting this distinction is 
to say that diagnostic criteria help to identify instances, in this case PTSD patients, whereas 
definitions explain what persons that meet a diagnosis have in common. A second point is 
closely related to the point just mentioned. If the DSM offers a definition, it is an operational 
definition. Operational definitions can be problematic, as they do not offer a satisfactory set of 
                                                          
10 Hacking, Ian. "Kinds of People: Moving Targets." Proceedings of the British Academy 151 (2007): 285-318. 
11 American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 4th Ed., Text Rev. 
Washington D.C, 2000. 
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conditions stating what is essential to being a member of a category.12 An operational definition 
of water might be that it is the stuff found in lakes and rivers, but this does not tell one what 
water is. A better definition of water would be ‘water is H20’. The DSM offers the first kind of 
definition; natural kinds concern the second. Therefore, the distinction between clinical criterion 
and definitions is important to the debate concerning the status of PTSD as a natural kind and 
this distinction is important to my inquiry here. I will account for this as follows. 
I am going to begin this essay by following the literature that criticizes this disorder, 
which typically overlooks the distinction between criteria and definitions, and proceeds with the 
assumption that the DSM criterion is definitional. Overlooking this distinction generates 
numerous conceptual difficulties and these problems will remain in the background throughout. 
Again, I will say more at the end of this essay in an effort to clarify conceptual confusions 
arising out of the points just stated. 
  Here is the organization of the remainder of this thesis. In the next section of this chapter, 
I will offer a working definition of PTSD and a paradigm case. In chapter two, I will offer 
reasons to support the claim that PTSD is a natural kind. In chapter three, I offer two accounts 
according to which natural kinds have been understood, essentialism and the homeostatic cluster 
view. Most arguments that attempt to show that PTSD is not a natural kind assume essentialism. 
I argue that if PTSD is a natural kind, it is a natural kind according to the homeostatic cluster 
view. In chapter four, I introduce two new objections to the claim that PTSD is a natural kind, 
addressing a series of challenges to my argument along the way. In chapter five, I conclude by 
developing a set of recommendations to address the issues I raise in this thesis.  
                                                          
12 The reason for the DSM’s use of operational definitions can be attributed to the influence of Carl Hempel. For a 
discussion see William C. Follette and Arthur C. Houts, "Models of Scientific Progress and the Role of Theory in 
Taxonomy Development: A Case Study of the DSM," Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 64, no. 6 
(1996): 1120-1132. 
5 
 
 
1. What is PTSD? Corporal Michael Smith & The DSM Criterion 
The fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV) offers the 
following diagnostic criteria of PTSD:13 
A. Criterion A: Stressor 
a. Exposure to stressor 
b. Emotional reaction to stressor 
B. Criterion B: Re-experiencing (requires one or more) 
a. Intrusive recollections 
b. Distressing dreams 
c. Acting/feeling as though event is recurring 
d. Psychological distress to reminders or cues that resemble the event 
e. Physiological reactivity when exposed to reminders 
C. Criterion C: Avoidance (requires three or more) 
a. Avoidance of thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the 
stressor 
b. Avoidance of activities, places or people associated with the stressor 
c. Inability to recall aspects of the trauma 
d. Diminished interest in significant activities 
e. Detachment or estrangement from others 
f. Restricted range of affect (e.g. unable to feel loving towards others) 
g. Sense of a foreshortened future (e.g. does not expect to have a career, 
marriage, children, or normal life span) 
D. Criterion D: Arousal (indicated by two or more) 
a. Difficulty falling or staying asleep 
b. Irritability or outbursts of anger 
c. Difficulty concentrating 
d. Hypervigilance 
e. Exaggerated startle response 
E. Criterion E: Duration 
a. Disturbance is present more than one month 
F. Criterion F: Distress or Impairment 
a. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning 
 
Criteria B-D can be understood as forming the core criteria of PTSD. First, PTSD 
patients exhibit re-experiencing symptoms (Criterion B) that may include intrusive memories or 
                                                          
13 For an alternative diagnostic criterion see ICD-10. For a comparison between the two sets of criteria, see L. 
Peters, T. Slade and G. Andrews, "A Comparison of ICD10 and DSM-IV Criteria for Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder," Journal of Traumatic Stress 12, no. 2 (1999): 335-343. 
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dreams of the trauma, accompanied by physiological distress. Secondly, patients manifest 
avoidance symptoms (Criterion C), which may include a restriction of thoughts and distancing 
from reminders of the event, as well as emotional and social isolation or withdrawal. Further, 
PTSD patients display hyper-arousal symptoms (Criteria D), where these include hypervigilance, 
insomnia, increased irritability, and difficulty concentrating. In addition to meeting the core 
criteria of PTSD, a diagnosis also requires each of the following symptoms are present: 
experience of a stressful event (Criterion A), prolonged duration of symptoms (Criterion E), 
presence of distress or impairment (Criterion F). These additional criteria form a set of additional 
conditions, which are coupled to core criteria B-D.14  
The story of Corporal Michael Smith provides a clear case of a patient who meets the 
diagnostic criteria for PTSD.15 During his third tour of duty in Iraq, Michael lost his right leg due 
to the explosion of a roadside bomb. At the same time, two other men in Michael’s squad were 
killed. I think it is clear that Michael meets Criterion A. Michael received physical therapy at 
Walter Reed Army Hospital and returned home. Six months later, Michael’s wife noticed that he 
had become irritable, moody and socially withdrawn. For example, Michael was emotionally 
avoidant of his family and friends and no longer enjoyed outings with his wife. In addition, 
Michael avoided potential triggers of war memories, such as watching war movies and fireworks 
displays. Eventually, Michael came to complain of difficulty sleeping, of intrusive thoughts and 
of nightmares of his experience. Michael meets the additional Criteria, B-F. In the next chapter, I 
provide a working account of natural kinds. 
 
                                                          
14 Yehuda et al., 2007; Brewin, Chris. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. 
15 Rumpler, Carol Hawthorne. "How Do You Intervene in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms Associated With 
Traumatic Injury?" Rehabilitation Nursing, (Sep/Oct 2008): 187-191. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
WHAT IS A NATURAL KIND? 
To discover a natural kind is to discover something that represents nature, carved at her 
joints.16 Besides water, additional examples of natural kinds might include gold, salt, tigers, 
children, vitamin C.17 Natural kinds are things that exist, without categorization, as members of a 
category (i.e., kind). Probably not everyone would agree that the members I include in my list are 
natural kinds. It is likely, however, that everyone would agree that a category such as “Fans of 
Miles Davis” does not constitute a natural kind category, as this category does not represent 
nature according to articulations of her design. My argument will focus on the status of PTSD as 
a natural kind. Thus, what counts as paradigmatic instances of a natural kind will not be 
discussed further, unless in the context of my arguments. 
Before proceeding, certain points of caution are worth pausing to address. There are 
many interesting issues concerning natural kinds.18 For example, not everyone agrees that there 
are natural kinds. These issues are not the target of this paper and are beyond the current scope of 
the issues I will address. I will not defend the thesis that there are natural kinds; I will assume 
                                                          
16 Many trace the origin of natural kinds back to Plato. In the Statesman, a visitor from Elea discusses what it is to 
divide a class according to its real nature. The relevant, if not somewhat grotesque, quote is spoken by the visitor: 
“Then let’s divide them limb by limb, like a sacrificial animal, since we can’t do it into two. For we must always cut 
into the nearest number we can” (Statesman 287c). I am going to go along with the crowd and point to Plato’s 
dialogue as an early mention of natural kinds. See also Ian Hacking, "A Tradition of Natural Kinds," Philosophical 
Studies, 1991: 109-126. I note that there are disputes over the history of natural kinds; for example, see Richard 
Boyd, "Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds," Philosophical Studies (Kluwer 
Academic Studies), 1991: 127-148 and Ian Hacking, "On Boyd," Philosophical Studies, 1991: 149-154. 
17 Bird, Alexander, Tobin, Emma, "Natural Kinds", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/natural-kinds/>. 
18 Hacking, 2007. Hacking, Ian. "Natural Kinds: Rosy Dawn, Scholastic Twilight." Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Suppement (Cambridge) 82 (2007): 203-239. Hacking, I. "A Tradition of Natural Kinds." Philosophical Studies, 
(1991): 109-126. Hacking, Ian. "On Boyd." Philosophical Studies, (1991): 149-154. In reply, see Richard Boyd, 
"Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds," Philosophical Studies (Kluwer Academic 
Studies), 1991: 127-148. Also, semantic issues are discussed in Scott Soames, "What are Natural Kinds?," 
Philosophical Topics, Forthcoming.   
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that some categories of classification are natural kind categories and refer to this claim as “the 
thesis of natural kinds.” 
It is not necessary that a category (or anything else, for that matter) is a natural kind 
category for it to be “real” – whatever “real” means. Money is not a natural kind, but certainly 
money is real in an important way.19 Also, many things are natural, in some sense of the word 
“natural” and these things may form a kind of thing, but they are not natural kinds in the relevant 
sense. For example, ‘Fans of Miles Davis’ is a real category in some sense of the word “real.” 
The persons that constitute this category are, in a sense, natural and form a kind, but these 
persons do not constitute a natural kind category. In contrast, paradigmatic examples of natural 
kinds are such things as water, salt, neurons, and protons. These things belong to a unified 
category and are natural in a way that warrants granting that these are candidates that should be 
considered natural kinds. In the next section I present some fundamental assumptions and 
desiderata that I will be assuming to hold with respect to natural kinds. 
 
1. General Desiderata of Natural Kinds 
There are six desiderata that one should expect of natural kinds20: 
• Natural Kinds are Mind-Independent 
• Natural Kinds Support Non-Accidental Inferences 
• Natural Kinds are Targets of Mechanistic Explanation 
• Natural Kinds are the Objects of Scientific Discovery 
• Natural Kinds Form Discrete Categories 
• Natural Kind Categories are Homogenous 
 
The mind independent desideratum should be expected of all natural kinds. The 
remaining desiderata are not assumed to be conditions that are individually necessary; nor are 
                                                          
19 Thanks to Dr. George Rainbolt for a discussion of this point.  
20 I am borrowing here from Richard Samuels, forthcoming. 
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they assumed to be individually or jointly sufficient.21 In this essay, these desiderata will serve 
to measure whether PTSD succeeds or fails to be a natural kind. It is worth mentioning that if it 
can be shown that PTSD meets all of the desiderata provided here, it is very likely to be a natural 
kind. If PTSD fails to meet all of the conditions mentioned here, it is very likely that PTSD is not 
a natural kind. Intermediate grounds might rest between these two extremes – failing to meet the 
desiderata, on the one hand, and succeeding to meet the desiderata, on the other. Intermediate 
cases should be, I believe, considered individually. Also, as our understanding of categories 
develops, the data will determine where or if the category fails to be a natural kind. This 
approach is, I think, ideal because it is likely that sometimes nature does not provide clear 
boundaries to be discovered in the first place and so it is unreasonable that a theory of natural 
kinds should be expected to find such boundaries in all cases. To be sure, there are natural 
boundaries and some of these are likely to be clearly circumscribed, meeting each of the 
desiderata I will present; nonetheless, the boundaries of nature are perhaps not always distinct 
and clear, and so possibly fail to meet the desiderata I have proposed. I would expect that some 
cases will fit the mold offered here perfectly and others will not. Perhaps PTSD will be of the 
second variety, the imperfect variety. In the next section I explain further each of the six 
desiderata and how they apply to PTSD. 
                                                          
21 Samuels states the same in a footnote: “What is the status of these characteristics of natural kinds? Clearly, they 
are important aspects of natural kinds and their role in scientific practice. But are all (or some) of them necessary 
conditions on natural kindhood; or are they merely typical, though unnecessary, features of natural kinds? These are 
interesting questions, though not ones I address here” (Samuels, forthcoming, fn 5, p. 9).  
10 
 
 
2. PTSD & The General Desiderata 
PTSD & Mind-independence 
Natural kinds are “natural” in the sense that neither the members of a natural kind 
category nor the category itself depend on minds for their existence. Natural kinds exist 
independently of human understanding and practices; individuation of natural kinds does not 
depend upon mental categorization.22 For example, constellations are not natural kinds. The 
collection of stars denoted by the name Orion fails the mind-independence desideratum, as this 
category depends upon minds for its existence. In contrast, the stars that make up the 
constellation Orion exist independently of human minds. Stars are likely to be natural kinds. 
One might argue that the diagnostic category provided in the DSM appears to be a 
constellation of symptoms, akin to the group of stars that form the constellation Orion. Thus, one 
might argue that it takes minds to categorize persons as having PTSD; therefore, PTSD is not a 
natural kind. This argument would confuse diagnosis with existence. I think it is fair to say that a 
diagnosis functions to identify one who has a disorder, but the fact that one has a disorder does 
not depend upon a diagnosis. A patient with PTSD might never be diagnosed with the disorder, 
but nevertheless have PTSD. In contrast, the constellation Orion would never have existed as 
such, were it not for minds to categorize the stars that make up this constellation into the set that 
forms the constellation we call Orion. 
One might also object that the DSM criteria require minds for their construction and 
inclusion into DSM, so the diagnosis is mind dependent in this sense. Therefore, PTSD, or any 
mental disorder for that matter, violates the mind independent desideratum. I offer two replies. 
First, this confuses the mind-independence of DSM criteria with the mind-independence of the 
                                                          
22 Boyd, 1991; Samuels, forthcoming. 
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disorder. We can concede that diagnostic criteria require minds for their individuation without 
committing to the disorder being mind dependent. Second, this would suggest that other 
disorders, mental or otherwise, which are diagnosed in terms of symptoms, would fail the mind-
independence requirement. However, there is no reason that simply having a constellation of 
diagnostic criteria warrants a denial of the mind-independence of the disorder itself.  
One might also argue that PTSD is a mental disorder and so, necessarily, mind 
dependent. To repeat, that PTSD is a mental disorder does not necessarily entail that it is not a 
natural kind. The question that is relevant to the status of PTSD as a natural kind is whether the 
disorder is mind dependent, not whether the disorder is a mental (as opposed to physical) 
disorder. Thus, PTSD might still be a natural kind, even if it is a mental disorder. Also, PTSD is 
a disorder; it is not a mental state. Beliefs, desires, and hopes are examples of mental states. 
PTSD disrupts these. My concern is with the nature of PTSD as a disruption (i.e., disorder) of 
mental states, not with the mental states themselves. 
 
PTSD & Non-Accidental Predictions 
In the introduction I mentioned that natural kinds are such that a limited number of 
observations of members of a natural kind category warrant non-accidental generalizations about 
all members of that category. In other words, natural kinds justify inferences insofar as 
inferences based upon a limited number of observations of members of a natural kind category 
are not mere accidents. We can infer that, if we were to discover water on Mars it would consist 
of H20 and, therefore, if we brought the water we found on Mars back to Atlanta, it would be 
wet. Other categories that are not natural kinds do not warrant such inferences. One who had 
seen only male United States Postal Workers would not be warranted to conclude that all United 
12 
 
States Postal Workers were male, even if this happens to be true. United States Postal Workers 
do not belong to a natural kind category. 
 Confusingly, some non-natural kind categories appear to support inductive inferences.23 
For example, legend suggests the Super Bowl predicts stock market performance.24 If the AFC 
wins, there appears to be approximately an 80% chance that the stock market will be down. The 
correlation between the Super Bowl and the stock market appears to support the prediction that, 
if the AFC wins, the stock market will be down. Someone could make a happy accidental 
prediction using this information and perhaps know when to buy or sell stock. However, if the 
prediction holds, it is not because the Super Bowl and the stock market form a natural kind. The 
correlation between the Super Bowl and the stock market is accidental. Natural kind categories 
do not support accidental inductive inferences of this kind. 
Empirical evidence suggests that PTSD yields reliable non-accidental predictions.25 Here 
are some examples of predictions that one might make of persons with PTSD. Veterans with 
PTSD appear to have higher peripheral levels of catecholamines, which are neurochemicals that 
are involved in stress responses.26 Another neurochemical, cortisol, appears to be lower in 
patients with PTSD than in patients with other psychiatric disorders.27 It has been argued that the 
hippocampus appears to be susceptible to damage as a result of stress experiences.28 Numerous 
                                                          
23 Some might want to include the category I mention as an example here as a type of natural kind. Boyd’s 
categorization is liberal enough to possibly support such categories as natural kind categories. If my example does 
not work for the reader, another may. For example, I would expect that there is a positive correlation between 
swimming pool installations in a neighborhood and higher water bills.  
24 http://www.snopes.com/business/bank/superbowl.asp Unknown, The Super Bowl Indicator, January 29, 2009, 
www.snopes.com/business/bank/superbowl.asp (accessed March 18, 2009). 
25 The information mentioned here is taken from a summary provided by Rachel Yehuda and Joseph LeDoux, 
"Response Variation following Trauma: A Translational Neuroscience Approach to Understanding PTSD," Neuron 
56 (2007): 19-32. For an alternative presentation of similar findings, see J. Douglas Bremner, Does Stress Damage 
the Brain? (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005). 
26 Yehuda and Ledoux, 2007. 
27 Mason, John W. "Urinary Free-Cortisol Levels in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Patients." Journal of Nervous and 
Mental Disease 174, no. 3 (1986): 145-149. 
28 Bremner, J. Douglas. Does Stress Damage the Brain? New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005. 
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other findings dispute those mentioned here; nonetheless, it is likely that as research develops, so 
will the set of predictions provided by the categorical understanding of PTSD. 
 
PTSD is a Target of Scientific Inquiry 
Non-accidental inferences are important to scientific discovery. Therefore, it should be 
no surprise that natural kinds make a likely study target for scientific domains of inquiry.29 The 
fact that natural kinds are objects of scientific discovery is also closely connected to the mind-
independence condition. Recall that natural kinds are discovered by minds, although they are 
mind independent. Because natural kind categories are discovered, their warrant is an a 
posteriori matter.30 One does not decide what categories are going to be natural kinds and then 
go and discover those categories. The business of science is to find natural kinds and to make 
(inductive) predictions about those kinds, eliminating unruly categories that do not yield reliable 
predictions.31 This elimination of categories is tantamount to a category’s demotion to the status 
of non-natural kind.32 
Aside from the fact that an abundance of research efforts are directed towards PTSD, 
PTSD appears to be a justified domain of inquiry within the sciences. I have already stated that 
PTSD appears to be mind-independent and to allow for non-accidental inductive inferences. 
Since science is in the business of discovering natural kinds, and it would appear that PTSD is a 
                                                          
29 See Samuels, forthcoming, p. 4. Also, it is not necessary that a member of a natural kind is an object of scientific 
inquiry – although I would suppose that natural kinds are all potential domains of scientific inquiry; nor is it 
sufficient that something is an object of scientific inquiry to render it a natural kind. It is not sufficient because many 
objects of scientific inquiry turn out to be scientific dead-ends, i.e., they fail to yield the results that are expected by 
scientific practices.  
30 Samuels, forthcoming 
31 For a recent exchange concerning scientific progress that is related to this position, see Darrell P. Rowbottom, "N-
rays and the semantic view of scientific progress," Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 2008: 277-278 
and Alexander Bird, "Scientific Progress As Accumulation Of Knowledge - A Reply To Rowbottom," History and 
Philosophy of Science 39 (2008): 279-281. I can’t address the issues in dispute between Bird and Rowbottom here. 
32 Phlogiston might be an example of such a case.  
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target of scientific explanation, one would expect it to be a natural kind. Of course science is an 
inductive enterprise, so this could turn out to be false. 
 
The Mechanisms that Underlie PTSD are a Target of Explanation 
We might identify water as the clear, wet, drinkable liquid that is found in lakes and 
rivers. However, statements such as “Water is wet” and “Water is clear” are contingently true 
statements - true only under the appropriate conditions (e.g., when the temperature is above 
freezing). Contingent statements can be contrasted with necessarily true statements such as “All 
bachelors are unmarried males.” While it might have turned out that water was not wet, it could 
never be that a bachelor was not an unmarried male.33 The contingent properties of kinds such as 
water (e.g., water is wet) establish a target for non-accidental predictions that can be explained 
by looking at the mechanisms that underlie these properties (e.g., the chemical structure of 
water). The contingently associated, yet reliably predictable non-accidental properties of kinds 
such as water are the targets of mechanistic explanation in the sciences. Once the chemical 
structure of water, H20, was discovered and understood, it served as a mechanistic way to explain 
the contingent properties of water, such as why water is a wet liquid at certain temperatures.34  
The possibility that natural kinds have contingent properties helps to put into perspective 
some of the puzzling features of PTSD that appear to challenge its status as a legitimate disorder, 
as these contingent features may nonetheless be understood in mechanistic terms. Two of these 
features are worth discussing in a bit more detail, as much of the literature concerning problems 
                                                          
33 Indeed, a contingent property of water is that it boils at various temperatures, depending on the altitude. 
34 There might be an invitation to interpret the Mechanistic Explanation desideratum as suggesting that all 
discoveries will eventually be of a reductive kind, such as that demonstrated by the discovery that the chemical 
composition of water is H20. However, there is no reason that this should be the case, although the Mechanistic 
Discovery desideratum is consistent with the possibility that a completely reductive account of all target explananda 
within the sciences is someday achieved. As it stands, this is an open matter that is to be resolved empirically. I 
make no claims here, one way or another. 
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with this disorder focuses on these, and both focus on Criterion A.35 One puzzling feature of 
PTSD is that not everyone gets PTSD as a result of the experience of a traumatic event 
(hereafter, “Not Everyone Problem”). This can be interpreted as a way of saying that the 
emergence of PTSD is contingent, which is similar to the fact that water’s being wet is a 
contingent fact about water. Just as there are contributory factors that supplement the chemical 
structure of water resulting in the phenomenon that water is wet, the phenomenon of PTSD 
following the experience of a traumatic event may not be explained solely in terms of 
mechanical features of the kind in question. Just as water’s wetness is contingent upon factors 
that are external to the chemical structure of water, so it is possible that external factors 
contribute to the emergence of symptoms of PTSD. A similar explanation is likely to apply to 
what I will refer to as the “Absent Cause Problem,” the problem that some persons that do not 
appear to have experienced a traumatic event nonetheless instantiate PTSD symptoms. 
Arguments that focus on issues resulting from Criterion A would be wise to recognize the 
prevalence of contingency in other less problematic areas of scientific discourse. 
 
PTSD Appears to Form A Discrete Category 
In addition to the four desiderata offered so far, natural kind categories must be discrete. 
Natural kind categories are circumscribed independent classes.36 For example, the term “water” 
picks out a distinct substance. Note that the boundaries of natural kinds may nonetheless be 
vague. For example, there may be no determinate temporal boundary that denotes when a person 
                                                          
35 See, e.g., Thomas Maier, "Weathers' and Keane's, "the Criterion A Problem Revisited: Controversies and 
Challenges in Defining and Measuring Psychological Trauma"," Journal of Traumatic Stress, October 2007: 915-
916. Also, Thomas Maier, "Post-traumatic Stress Disorder Revisited: Deconstructing the A-criterion," Medical 
Hypothesis, 2006: 103-106. Frank W. Weathers and Terence M. Keane, "The Criterion A Problem Revisited: 
Controversies and Challenges in Defining and Measuring Psychological Trauma," Journal of Traumatic Stress, 
April 2007: 107-121. 
36 Samuels, forthcoming, p. 5 – 6 
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becomes an adult human, but that does not mean that “adult humans” are not a natural kind 
(ibid). Note further that the discreteness desideratum does not entail that natural kind categories 
will not overlap. One might be both a “human” and an “adult,” where both are understood as 
natural kind categories. However, if one natural kind category is co-extensional with another 
natural kind category, these two categories are likely to be one and the same natural kind (ibid). 
Although PTSD might exist along a continuum, where some cases are more paradigmatic 
than other cases, there are clear cases of PTSD. These cases are likely to form a discrete class of 
persons. I introduced Michael as a paradigm case of a patient with PTSD. Michael’s conditions 
would likely be conditions that, stated explicitly, help to circumscribe a discrete category of 
disorder; other persons with conditions similar to those that Michael exhibits would fall within 
the same diagnostic boundaries. While another patient might not instantiate PTSD conditions as 
clearly as Michael, this does not entail that PTSD is not a natural kind. Also, patients with PTSD 
may also have other mental (e.g., addictions) or physical problems (e.g., somatic injuries), but 
this does not preclude PTSD from being a natural kind. 
 
Patients with PTSD form a Homogenous Kind 
The final desideratum is that natural kinds are homogenous, rather than heterogenous, 
which is a way of saying that members of a natural kind form one cohesive unit. Disjunctive 
categories would violate this condition, as these categories are not unified in a way that is 
appropriate to natural kinds. An example of a violation of this desideratum is the category 
“house or car or bicycle.” The category “house or car or bicycle” would not be a likely source of 
reliable predictions and would not “carve nature at its joints.” Such categories are arbitrary 
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categories and so are not natural kind categories, although it is possible to stipulate that they are 
a kind of category. 
The Homogeneity desideratum would be violated if the persons meeting the diagnosis of 
PTSD were to be discovered as being different, in kind – i.e., if it were to be found that the 
members of the category were of several distinct types of un-related kinds, similar to the 
category of “house or car or bicycle.”37 Because the data is still coming in, this remains an active 
and open possibility. Nonetheless, there does seem to be evidence favoring the conclusion that 
PTSD patients are sufficiently similar so as to form a homogenous kind.38 
 
Summary 
I have provided reasons to think that PTSD meets the desiderata one would expect of a 
natural kind. Admittedly, some of the reasons I have provided are tentative and others are offered 
in defense of the arguments criticizing this claim. I will proceed on the assumption that PTSD 
meets the desideratum. In the next section, I present two theories of natural kinds. One is 
appropriate to considering PTSD as a natural kind, whereas the other is an overly restrictive and 
inappropriate thesis of natural kinds according to which to consider PTSD. 
                                                          
37 For exactly this kind of argument, see Allan Young, The Harmony Of Illusions - Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995). Young’s argument fails for a deeper reason, 
which I will address in the next section. 
38 Bremner, 2005, does a nice job of summarizing this evidence. For another summary, see also Yehuda and 
LeDoux, 2007. 
18 
 
 
CHAPTER 3. 
TWO THESES OF NATURAL KINDS 
According to “essentialism,” natural kinds have an essential property or feature that 
groups them together.39 Alternatively, one can understand natural kinds as having a causal basis 
that is manifested in a clustering of observable properties according to which the members of a 
kind are grouped together, a thesis known as the “homeostatic cluster view” of natural kinds. I 
will argue here that if PTSD is a natural kind, it is best understood as a natural kind according to 
the homeostatic cluster view and not essentialism.  
 
1. The First Thesis: Essentialism 
The essential features of natural kinds required by essentialism are assumed to be both 
necessary and sufficient for inclusion into a natural kind category. “Traditional” essentialism 
holds that the following basic tenets are met by a natural kind category:40 
E1. All and only the members of a kind share a common essence. 
 
E2. The essence is a property, or a set of properties, that all the members of a kind must 
have. 
 
E3. The properties that comprise a kind’s essence are intrinsic – i.e. non-relational – 
properties. 
 
E4. A kind’s essence causes the other properties associated with that kind. 
 
I will assume that water can be used as an example that meets these criteria. Satisfying E1, the 
essence of water is the chemical structure, H20. That is, combining two hydrogen molecules with 
an oxygen molecule makes water and this will only make water. Satisfying E2, instances of the 
                                                          
39 Samuels, forthcoming 
40 Quoted here from Samuels, forthcoming, p. 11 
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natural kind category water will have the same chemical structure, H20. One will not find water 
that is essentially something other than H20.41 Satisfying E3, the chemical structure (H20) is 
intrinsic to the members or instances of the natural kind water, rather than relationally dependent 
upon something external to water. For example, the chemical structure H20 is non-accidental, 
unlike the fact that water is drinkable by humans and animals. Finally, satisfying E4, the 
chemical structure of water, H20, is the cause of the other properties associated with the kind 
water. One can explain why water is wet in virtue of its chemical structure.  
Essentialism is committed to a strict notion of essences, which can be called sortal 
essences.42 Sortal essences are “as a matter of metaphysical necessity” possessed by all members 
of a kind and only members of a kind.43 The sortal essence of water is H20. To say that the sortal 
essence of water is H20 means that if the essential structure of a substance is H20, then that 
substance is water, and if an essential structure of something is not H20, then that something is 
not water. This does not mean that other things can’t be constituted by water. Humans, for 
example, are largely constituted by water; however, it is not essential to being a human that one’s 
chemical structure is H20.44 
                                                          
41 See Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972, 1980). 
42 Samuels cites Gelman and Hirschfield, 1999. Gelman and Hirschfield state, “The sortal essence is the set of 
defining characteristics that all and only members of a category share” (Susan A. Gelman and Lawrence A. 
Hirschfeld, "How Biological is Essentialism?," in Folkbiology, 403-446 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999).  
43 Samuels, forthcoming, p. 12 
44 There is a problem with using water as an example. Is soda water water in the same sense as tap-water? What 
about fruit punch? What is the essence of these? If this is a problem for the reader, the example might be changed to 
gold or electrons. In any case, I take it that there is some paradigmatic case of a natural kind in the essentialist sense. 
Perhaps not, but this does not undermine my argument and in fact may make my position more tenable because it 
seems that something must carve nature at its joints, and if it is not according to the essentialist account it must be 
according to the non-essentialist account. Thus, I leave the assumption in place here that water meets the essentialist 
criteria. 
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Problems with Essentialism 
Essentialism works well for some paradigmatic instances of natural kinds such as water. 
However, because sortal essences prescribe a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
membership into a natural kind category, this is a problematic way to understand natural kinds. 
One problem is that many categories that are the objects of interest in the sciences have vague 
boundaries and do not adhere to a set of necessary and sufficient conditions; thus, essentialism 
rules out many plausible natural kind categories. For example, biological kinds, such as the 
species “dog,” do not appear to possess any essence that would qualify them as constituting a 
natural kind, according to the requirements of essentialism.45 Is it essential that all dogs have 
four legs? Is it essential that all dogs have hair? No. A bald three-legged dog is still a dog; thus, 
neither having four legs nor being hairy should be considered as essential to being a member of 
the species “dog.” Moreover, it is not clear what is essential to being a dog. Nonetheless, it 
seems that biological kinds such as the category “dog” are “appropriate for the purposes of 
formulating robust empirical generalizations.”46 Also, to the extent that biological kinds such as 
dogs are appropriate for the purposes of formulating robust empirical generalizations, they “are 
natural kinds of the sort that concern us.”47 This last statement raises an important point, which is 
that natural kinds are relative to domains of inquiry and this point is worth pausing to discuss 
further. 
It appears that a natural kind is whatever concerns “us.” Thus, one might think that 
anything goes when it comes to natural kinds because the referent of “us” may be just about 
                                                          
45 Of course, it could be discovered that there is some essence – perhaps genetic – that does warrant the category of 
dogs as being a natural kind according to essentialism. For a discussion of genetics and natural kinds see Peter 
Zachar, "Psychiatric Disorders Are Not Natural Kinds," Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 2001: 167-182. 
46 Samuels, forthcoming, p. 12 
47 Ibid 
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anyone. This is not the correct interpretation, however. The conditions mentioned in section one 
serve to rule out the possibility of such relativistic theses. This is consistent with natural kinds 
being relative to a domain of inquiry. For example, what is a natural kind in psychology may not 
be a natural kind in neurobiology. The objects of interest in each domain should be expected to 
meet most, if not each, of the desiderata of natural kinds offered above. I set this aside and return 
to the discussion of essentialism. 
An essentialist might simply submit that the things that don’t meet the essentialist criteria 
are, as a matter of metaphysical fact, not members of a natural kind category. An essentialist 
might suggest further that there are other kinds, for example, human kinds (e.g., “Fans of Miles 
Davis”), that are objects within a domain of inquiry relative to some, perhaps scientific, 
practices.48 Nonetheless, an essentialist might insist that these kinds fail to meet the essentialist 
criteria for natural kind-hood and so are not natural kinds. It is worth pausing to address this 
complaint in further detail. 
First, I am not arguing against essentialism in this paper. I am assuming that essentialism 
is not a workable thesis for all cases of natural kinds because it excludes certain categories as 
being natural kinds that are important for certain domains of scientific inquiry. Second, it is 
consistent with my position that some natural kinds may adhere to essentialist requirements. Of 
course, it could turn out that I am wrong to make this assumption because I also maintain that 
natural kinds are discovered a posteriori.49 Therefore, empirical evidence will bear upon this 
issue. It might turn out that science fails to discover any essences whatsoever in the case of 
PTSD, causal or sortal.50 For now it is enough to say that essentialism appears to be problematic 
                                                          
48  See Ian Hacking, 1991, 109-126. I am not claiming that Hacking is an essentialist, however.  
49 Samuels makes this point several times. 
50 Gelman and Hirschfield write,  “Biologists insist that biological species do not truly have essences” (p. 405).  I am 
sure there is a biologist ready to refute this statement, or perhaps a philosopher. It is worth noting that the human 
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in some cases that would otherwise be plausible candidates for inclusion into a natural kind 
category and that this should lead us to seek out an alternative understanding of natural kinds.  
 
PTSD and Essentialism  
 Essentialism provides several reasons to suggest that PTSD is not a natural kind.51 Here I 
present an argument that one might make in support of the claim that PTSD is not a natural kind, 
aimed at Criterion A:  
P1) Not everyone that meets Criterion A (i.e., experiences a traumatic event) gets PTSD. 
 
P2) Not everyone with the symptoms of PTSD meet Criterion A (i.e., some persons have 
PTSD symptoms that have not experienced a traumatic event) 
 
P3) Therefore, Criterion A is not essential to developing PTSD. 
 
C) Therefore, PTSD is not a natural kind. 
 
The first two premises of this argument are true and these provide support for premise three. 
Thus, if essentialism were the only way to understand natural kinds, the argument would be 
cogent. It is likely that other diagnostic criteria of PTSD can be substituted for the premises 
offered here to construct different arguments for the same conclusion. For example, one might 
argue that not everyone with PTSD meets Criterion B (re-experiencing) and so forth.  
 The key, however, is to notice that if essentialism were the only means by which to 
understand natural kind categories, the Anti-Essentialist Argument would be a serious challenge, 
if not outright threat, to the potential for PTSD to be considered a natural kind. But I have shown 
that similar arguments can be made for other categories that are target explanandum within the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
genome was mapped around the same time as Gelman and Hirschfield’s publication. Perhaps this would challenge 
their claim. 
51 Essentialism’s requirements have been the ground for the rejection of psychiatric disorders as natural kinds in 
other places (e.g., Zachar 2001). I don’t intend to reply to these criticisms here; however, there is a chance that what 
I will argue as applying to PTSD is likely to apply, ceteris paribus, to other categories of mental disorder as well – 
though perhaps not all categories of mental disorder. 
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sciences (e.g., species such as “dogs”). Thus, we should seek an alternative thesis of natural 
kinds. The homeostatic cluster view provides this alternative. 
 
2. The Second Thesis: Homeostatic Property Cluster View 
Here is the central idea of the homeostatic property cluster view (hereafter, “HPC”). First, 
HPC is consistent with the claim that some natural kind categories are grouped according to a set 
of contingently correlated properties.52 Second, these correlated properties are brought about by 
a mechanism or set of mechanisms and this explains the correlation.53 Thus, HPC avoids 
commitment to necessary and sufficient conditions.  
Unlike essentialism’s appeal to sortal essences, HPC appeals to causal essences. Sortal 
essences are to be understood as a subset of causal essences; all sortal essences are causal 
essences, but not all causal essences are sortal essences.54 Gelman and Hirschfield state, “The 
causal essence is the substance, power, quality, process, relationship, or entity that causes other 
category-typical properties to emerge and be sustained and confers identity.”55 Sidestepping 
disputes over Gelman and Hirschfield’s definition, the difference between sortal essences and 
causal essences can be understood as a difference between an essentialist requirement for natural 
kinds and the HPC requirement for natural kinds, which is provided by a possibly mutable, 
causal foundation that accounts for the emerging properties by which one identifies a member of 
a natural kind. Thus, causal essences are neither necessary nor sufficient for membership in a 
natural kind category - although they could be, in which case a set of causal essences would turn 
out to be identical to a set of sortal essences. Causal essences provide a looser framework upon 
                                                          
52 Boyd, 1991 
53 Ibid 
54 Samuels, forthcoming, p. 12 
55 Gelman and Hirschfield, 1999, p. 406 
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which to build natural kind categories and for cases such as “dog” to be included in a natural 
kind category  - and as we will see, PTSD. 
HPC can be characterized according to the following claims  (Samuels forthcoming, p.9-
10): 
H1: It [a natural kind] is associated with a contingent property cluster – a range of 
characteristics or symptoms, which tend to be co-instantiated by instances of the kind but 
need not be genuine necessary conditions for membership. 
 
H2: There is some set of empirically discoverable causal mechanisms, processes, 
structures and constraints – a causal essence, if you will – that causally explains the co-
variation of these various symptoms. 
 
H3: To the extent that there is any real definition of what it is for something to be a 
member of the kind, it is not the symptoms, as such, but the causal essence that defines 
membership. More precisely, to the extent that natural kinds have definitions, it is the 
presence of a causal essence producing (some of) the symptoms that comprise the 
property cluster that defines kind membership. 
 
It will be helpful to provide a clear example of a kind that meets Samuels’s requirements. 
Earlier, it was mentioned that the species “dog” did not fit into the essentialist view of natural 
kinds. However, the species “dog” can be understood as a natural kind category according to 
HPC. Satisfying H1, we can understand being covered with fur, having four legs, making a 
barking noise, and chasing one’s tail in a circle as a cluster of contingent properties that most, 
but not all, dogs share. Satisfying H2, there is likely to be a mechanism or a set of mechanisms 
that explain these properties that dogs commonly share (e.g., perhaps the information carried by 
DNA would be an example of such a mechanism). Finally, satisfying H3, if there is a definition 
of “dogs” based upon these shared properties, the properties that form the basis of this definition 
are due to some kind of causal essence (e.g., perhaps the DNA structure is a likely candidate that 
would meet this requirement). HPC can be applied to PTS, as I will show next. 
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PTSD fits the HPC Thesis of Natural Kinds  
Beginning with H3, the DSM criteria can be understood as a definition that is formed on 
the basis of contingent properties that may be explained in mechanistic terms.56 The source of 
these contingent properties is the subject of ongoing discovery within the domains of 
psychology, neurobiology, neurophysiology, etc. Thus, if patients fail to manifest each and every 
DSM criteria, this does not in any way constitute a challenge to the status of PTSD as a natural 
kind. Return again to the “Absent Cause Problem” and the “Not Everyone Problem.” I have 
already discussed that these problems might be best understood in a way that is analogous to the 
contingent features of other natural kinds such as the fact that water is wet or that dogs have fur. 
Here I suggest that there are likely to be mechanisms discovered that causally relate to the 
contingent properties according to which one diagnoses PTSD, just as the chemical structure of 
water causally explains the contingent feature of water’s wetness. 
Turning to H2, it is the causal mechanisms that are relevant in determining the natural 
kind status of a category. The progress of disciplines that work towards a discovery of the 
mechanisms underlying the symptoms provided in the DSM is, as mentioned earlier, ongoing. 
Therefore, it is an open question as to whether there is a discrete set of causal mechanisms 
responsible for PTSD and its associated symptoms. It is too early to rule out such possibilities. 
Earlier, however, I mentioned a set of predictions that PTSD provides. It is likely that these 
predictions will guide the discovery of mechanisms that underwrite PTSD’s status as a natural 
kind. Let me set this aside and address a distinction that is crucial to recognize. 
There is an important distinction between proximate causal sources, contributory causal 
sources, and distal causal sources. Water is wet because of the molecular structure of H20 – 
arguably, a proximate cause. However, for water to be wet also requires that the air pressure and 
                                                          
56 A mechanistic explanation need not be at a “lower level” of description (e.g., neurobiological).  
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temperature is at a particular level – arguably, a pair of contributory causes. Finally, water is wet 
because of the big bang – arguably, a distal cause. The essence, in the case of water, is attributed 
to the proximal cause, the chemical structure H20. It is reasonable to expect that there might be 
found an analogous set of causes responsible for the disorder known as PTSD. Empirical 
evidence supports this claim.  
As an example of divergent, yet consistent, explanatory levels employed in an 
explanation of PTSD, anatomical evidence points to the hippocampus as an explanatory source 
of the emergence of PTSD following traumatic experience.57 Other evidence rests at the 
neurochemical level, appealing to explanations involving an imbalance of (e.g.) cortisol levels.58 
Still others suggest that previous social experiences are implicated in those who develop the 
disorder, implicating causes at a “higher” social level, which might be understood as remote 
causes of PTSD.59 Nonetheless, whatever mechanisms turn out to be relevant to the status of 
PTSD as a natural kind, assuming that some set of mechanisms are eventually found, they are not 
likely to be identical to the DSM criterion, as this criterion rests upon observable, contingent 
features – analogous to the fact that, under optimal conditions, water is wet and dogs have fur. Of 
course, it is also possible to identify, from the start, the essences of natural kinds based upon 
superficial features alone. It is not likely, however, that PTSD is one such case.  
I have already mentioned the role of H1, but it is worth stating again: the contingent 
properties used to define PTSD are not necessary to the disorder. Again, an analogy is helpful. It 
would appear that water is necessarily wet; this is not the case. At best, water is necessarily 
                                                          
57 Bremner, 2005 
58 Yehuda and Ledoux, 2007 
59 Ibid 
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H20.60 Similar points are likely to apply to PTSD, assuming that PTSD is a natural kind. Certain 
features of PTSD are apparently necessary to the diagnosis, but this necessity might be mistaken. 
Again, empirical discovery will bear upon this issue.61 I turn now to a common objection to 
HPC. 
 
Is HPC Overly Permissive?  
Whereas essentialism is too restrictive, one might complain that HPC is too permissive.62 
According to HPC, it might appear that many things can be natural kinds that we don’t want to 
be natural kinds. For example, one might suggest that “Fans of Miles Davis” is a category that 
meets the HPC criteria, but not a class that should be considered a natural kind. 
Samuels provides a two-pronged response to this concern. First, if it is a problem for 
HPC, then it appears to be a problem for essentialism as well. Samuels argues that there is no a 
priori reason that one couldn’t find something essential about, e.g., Miles Davis’s fans that 
makes them members of the category “Fans of Miles Davis.”63 After all, they are all his fans. 
Perhaps this might be explained by appealing to some causal essence they all share. The second 
horn of Samuels’s reply is that HPC is also consistent with the impossibility of social kinds being 
natural kinds.64 It may be that there is a fact or set of facts that make it impossible for kinds such 
as “Fans of Miles Davis” to be considered members of a natural kind.65 For example, perhaps 
                                                          
60 This is largely held to be true. “Water” is a rigid designator, which is to say that once the initial baptism of water 
takes place, i.e., once the term “water” was used to identify H20, whatever ostensive definition was given at the time 
determined the extension of the natural kind term. Thus, because H20 was the thing that was “pointed” to in the 
initial baptism of water, it is this that we now call water. Had it been XYZ, things may have been different. These 
issues are beyond the scope of this paper. See Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1972, 1980). 
61 There is another contingency that concerns arguments for the multiple-realizability of mental states, but I don’t 
have space here to address these issues. 
62 Samuels, forthcoming; Hacking, 1991 
63 Perhaps there is a gene that explains why some are addicted? 
64 Samuels, forthcoming, p. 14 
65 Ibid 
28 
 
some persons are fans of Miles Davis because they like his music, whereas others are fans of 
Miles Davis because they like what he did for music. That is, perhaps there is neither a causal 
nor a sortal essence that explains the homogeneity of the class “Fans of Miles Davis.” 
I am not going to adjudicate the success of Samuels’s response here. One might reply that 
there might be a way to hang together many kinds such as “Fans of Miles Davis” and call them a 
natural kind because they meet the criteria for HPC so far mentioned and one might think this is 
a problem. Because I am not attempting to argue that PTSD is in fact a natural kind, but rather 
that if it is discovered to be a natural kind, it will likely be discovered to be a natural kind 
according to the HPC thesis of natural kinds, my argument does not hang on defending HPC 
from the over-permissiveness objection. However, Samuels provides an alternative response 
consistent with my argument that I do think is right. The defense is that it is an a posteriori 
matter whether social kinds are natural kinds.66 I will add to this defense: true, it might be 
strange to find that categories such as “Fans of Miles Davis” meet the requirements of HPC and 
so appear to be a natural kind, but I suppose that many things discovered by science look strange 
at first glance. This is bolstered by the point Samuels makes in stating that it is consistent to say 
that certain categories might not be found to have causal essences that appear, prima facie, to 
meet HPC. That is, we might think that something will turn out to be a natural kind, whereas 
there is nothing available to support such a claim. 
 
Summary 
  Most arguments that reject the claim that PTSD is a natural kind assume essentialism and 
I have shown why PTSD is not best understood in essentialist terms, defending the claim that 
PTSD might be found to be a natural kind according to the HPC view of natural kinds. In 
                                                          
66 Ibid 
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addition, I have addressed a common objection to HPC. So far, there is no reason to think that 
PTSD is not a natural kind. In the next section, I provide two novel challenges to this claim. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
TWO WORRIES: RATIONALITY AND THE LOOPING EFFECT 
 What makes PTSD a disorder? I will argue that rationality can help answer this question.  
 
1. The First Problem: Rationality and Norms 
To say that PTSD is a psychological or mental disorder implies that there is, somehow 
and somewhere, order. Order implies there are standards or norms.67 Recall Michael. To 
diagnose Michael as a person with PTSD is not merely describing Michael. To say that Michael 
has PTSD is also claiming that there is a way that Michael ought to be.68 What are these 
standards? I am going to claim that the standards that make Michael’s condition a disorder are 
standards of rationality. 
Consider the following display of Michael’s avoidance behavior. In response to his 
wife’s pleading, Michael would take his wife to outings and events such as parties, but remain in 
the car while she attended.69Assuming that Michael desires to go to the party and desires to be 
with his wife, how should we explain Michael’s behavior?70 If it is Michael’s desire, then he 
should attend the party with his wife. One explanation for Michael’s behavior is that Michael 
wants to avoid triggering the nightmares and memories that are so distressing to him. After all, 
who wants to feel distress? Thus, in a sense, Michael’s reaction is a rational response to avoiding 
distress. If we were like Michael, we might behave in the same way. But Michael’s memories 
                                                          
67 I will be using the term “standards” as a synonym for “norms”. Most philosophers talk about norms. 
68 The idea I apply here is adopted from Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
69 Rumpler, 2008, p.187 
70 In other words, I am going to assume that Michael is not simply “throwing a tantrum” or something similar, 
eliminating from the possible explanations that Michael is being stubborn, immature, hates his wife, dislikes parties, 
etc.   
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and nightmares and the roles they play require further understanding, as it is likely that everyone 
has distressing memories and nightmares, but this does not typically make persons avoid social 
gatherings that they otherwise desire to attend. Thus, it is not simply that Michael has memories 
and nightmares and that he wants to avoid these, but Michael’s memories and nightmares are 
disrupting his life by getting in the way of his desires and wishes and it is this disruption that 
begs for understanding. It is in this sense that Michael is irrational: PTSD is disrupting Michael’s 
otherwise rational thought processes. 
One explanation for this disruption is provided by two claims that are made of persons 
with PTSD: 1) PTSD patients view the world as unsafe; and 2) PTSD patients view themselves 
as unfit to act in the world.71 Suppose these claims are true. If so, we can describe Michael as 
seeing the world as an unsafe place and as understanding himself as unfit to act in the world. 
Thus, rather than joining his wife at a party, Michael chooses to stay in the car in order to avoid a 
world that he sees as dangerous and that he interprets himself as unfit to act upon.72 Avoidance 
symptoms such as Michael’s can be understood as a breakdown in rationality insofar as the 
patient’s view of the world disrupts the patient’s life. Notice that I say it is a “breakdown” in 
rationality, which is not the same as saying that Michael is irrational, full stop. Michael’s 
behavior displays a breakdown in rationality because it is, in a sense, rational for Michael to stay 
in the car. Once we understand Michael, we can understand why he does what he does. Again, 
                                                          
71 Herbert, James D., and Evan M. Forman. "Posttraumatic Stress Disorder." In Practice Guidelines for Evidence 
Based Psychotherapy. New York, New York: Springer, Forthcoming. Foa, Edna B., and Barbara Olasov Rothbaum. 
Treating the Trauma of Rape. New York, New York: The Guilford Press, 1998. Bolton, Derek, and Jonathan Hill. 
Mind, Meaning, and Mental Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
72 Dr. Kim Huhman points out that Michael might be avoiding the scene that might ensue if he were to have a 
flashback or a panic episode. Thus, it is rational for Michael to stay in the car. I concede this point, but I think that 
this still entails a rational process that is disrupted by his disorder. A person without PTSD (and perhaps this is true 
for other anxiety disorders) would seem to be able to reason with themselves and convince themselves that no 
threats existed at the party that warranted thoughts such as those that lead to panic attacks and flashbacks. This is not 
available to Michael. In other words, you and I may be able to “snap out of it” but Michael can’t. This is where his 
disorder is located.  
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the flashbacks and panic attacks that accompany this disorder are no doubt terrible to experience. 
Nonetheless, avoiding the party is not what we think Michael ought to do, nor is it (I am 
assuming) what Michael thinks he ought to do.  
Moreover, unlike you or I, Michael can’t just “snap out of it” and get on with things 
according to a plan that would allow Michael to live a flourishing life.73 Michael’s wife can’t 
simply reason with Michael to get him to attend the event by her side. This point is important for 
Michael’s disorder. Michael’s disordered behavior is not subject to rational influences of reason 
in the same way you and I might be when we are asked to go to a party that perhaps we would 
rather not attend. For Michael, reason and rationality have been truncated (see Graham 2010). It 
is not rational to think that the world is unsafe and it is not rational for Michael to think that he is 
unfit to act upon the world when these thoughts are false. We can speculate that a social event is 
likely to be held in a safe place and that, for the most part, Michael is likely to be plenty fit to 
attend such an event. Indeed, a social event in America is a long way from the streets of Baghdad 
and many persons would likely be interested in hearing about Michael’s experiences, were he 
comfortable enough to share them.74 But for Michael, these points do not matter. He represents 
the world differently. These points bear upon the status of PTSD as a mental disorder as follows. 
                                                          
73 For a related point: Nomy Arpaly, "How It is Not "Just Like Diabetes": Mental Disorders And the Moral 
Psychologist," Philosophical Issues 15 (2005).  
74 There is a sense in which Michael views the world quite accurately. After all, he has been severely wounded. For 
him, the world is not a safe place. But this should be contextually dependent. Michael is likely to be very accurate in 
his assessment of the safety of the world with respect to war zones, but not accurate with respect to social venues. 
Similarly, perhaps Michael is accurate to think that he is unfit to act in a war zone, but this is not likely to be the 
case in a social setting – assuming that all else is equal for Michael, which it is not. This, of course, is the target to 
be explained.  
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Mental States, Intentionality and Rationality 
Intentionality is often regarded as the “mark of the mental” and rationality is closely tied 
to intentionality.75 Paradigmatic intentional states are mental states such as beliefs and desires. 
When we assume that Michael wants (i.e., desires) to attend the party with his wife, we have 
assumed that Michael has an intentional mental state. Intentionality can help to explain the 
disorder of PTSD. I will use Michael as a vehicle to demonstrate how intentionality and 
rationality can help to accommodate this explanation.  
Michael’s beliefs and desires concerning the party are connected to a network of other 
beliefs and desires.76 For example, perhaps Michael believes that attending the party would be a 
good thing to do with his wife because he loves her, because he believes that the party is 
important to her, and because friends that he hasn’t spoken with since his return that he desires to 
see will also be attending, and so on. Thoughts such as these represent beliefs and desires that are 
rational. On the other hand, Michael probably does not believe that the host or hostess will serve 
rocks for dessert or that Baby Jesus will attend the party to perform solo on a tin drum. These 
thoughts would represent irrational beliefs. 
Michael appears to think that it is better that he stays in the car while his wife attends the 
party, which we have assumed is contrary to his desires. Presumably, he does this for some 
reason. I have suggested that an explanation of Michael’s behavior is that he behaves so as to 
avoid memories and nightmares; however, the memories and nightmares aren’t at the party – at 
                                                          
75 A paradigmatic account of intentionality is offered in John Searle, Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983). For further explanation of intentionality and rationality in the context of mental disorders, 
see George Graham, The Disordered Mind (Routledge , 2010); Derek Bolton and Jonathan Hill, Mind, Meaning, and 
Mental Disorder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
76 For an explanation of the network of intentional states that I am modeling this account on see John Searle, 
Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). There are likely to be other alternative explanations 
of rationality in intentionality, consistent with my claims.  
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best, there may be reminders of events he has witnessed at the party, but this is not definite. It is 
also true that an event at the party may elicit an episode that is a manifestation of Michael’s 
disorder, but this is support of the claim that I am making. Here is why. Michael’s disorder is 
interrupting his life because his beliefs and desires are in conflict with one another. Thus, the 
disorder of PTSD is a disorder due to the interruption of rationality that PTSD is causing among 
Michael’s intentional states. The set of beliefs that form the network of Michael’s intentional 
mental states is altered as a result of Michael’s experience. Understanding Michael’s behavior as 
the result of truncated rationality can be of assistance in understanding Michael.  
It does not work for Michael’s wife to simply assure Michael that “everything will be 
O.K.” It is precisely this kind of breakdown in rational thought that makes Michael’s disorder be 
the disorder that it is. This is why Michael stays in the car while his wife attends a party and this 
point applies as a challenge to the natural kind thesis. 
 
Norms of Rationality Make PTSD Mind-Dependent 
 Earlier I stated that natural kinds should be mind-independent. The nature of natural 
kinds is such that they are not susceptible to mental influences. Water does not stop being the 
thing that it is or change its behavior because of the presence of some set of beliefs. Water will 
be what it is, in the same way that it has always been, no matter where and how one might find it. 
The challenge that rationality provides to the thesis that PTSD is a natural kind is that when one 
considers the role of rationality in mental disorders such as PTSD, it is not clear that these 
disorders are mind-independent in a way that is required to regard them as natural kinds. Insofar 
as minds are subject to norms of rationality and norms of rationality are constitutive of 
intentional states, then the absence or truncation of rational norms appear to be constitutive of 
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disordered mental states. And this consequence seems to be avoidable only by eliminating norms 
of rationality from the explanation of all intentional states, which does not appear to be plausibly 
in view at this time.77  
 Recall that natural kinds allow one to seek causal mechanisms that explain a given 
phenomenon. In the currently considered case, one seeks the causal mechanisms of PTSD. I have 
suggested here that what is necessary to explain PTSD will entail an explanation that accounts 
for breakdowns in rationality. Therefore, a mechanistic explanation of PTSD would entail an 
explanation of the truncated norms of rationality. This is a tall order and one that it is not 
currently in view. Of course, one can remain optimistic. To return to an assumption of this essay 
- that natural kinds are to be discovered, a posteriori - it is possible that such a mechanistic 
account of rationality and the mechanisms underlying PTSD will one day be developed. For now 
the challenge stands as a stubborn obstacle to explanations of mental disorders, PTSD included, 
and thus of their status as natural kinds. Before moving on, I will address two challenges to my 
claims. 
 
Challenge One: Samuels’s Reply to the Norms of Rationality 
 I am suggesting that norms of rationality help to determine the disorder of PTSD and that 
this challenges understanding PTSD as a natural kind. Samuels offers a challenge to this 
argument that deserves a reply. Samuels argues that there are two sources of norms relative to 
mental disorders, medical norms and rational norms.78 According to Samuels, medical norms 
would challenge the thesis that PTSD is a natural kind only if it was determined by these norms 
                                                          
77 I have in mind here efforts to “naturalize” the mind. See, e.g., Fred Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1995). 
78 I remind the reader that Samuels’s concern is aimed at delusions, not mental disorders on a whole. I have adopted 
his account for my purposes.  
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that PTSD is “necessarily harmful or otherwise problematic relative to the relevant medical 
norms.”79 I don’t think that PTSD is problematic only according to medical norms, relative or 
otherwise. I think it is safe to say that PTSD is harmful and problematic, simpliciter. That is, I 
think that PTSD is necessarily harmful. Even if we grant that PTSD functions to keep one alive 
in a certain circumstance, there is evidence that the longterm result is detrimental to one’s 
health.80 Thus, medical norms are not going to concern me further here. Samuels’s reply to the 
challenge that norms of rationality provide, as I have presented it here, is more difficult. 
 According to Samuels’s reasoning, it would need to be shown that manifestations of 
PTSD are essentially, i.e, necessarily, irrational. I have suggested that PTSD might not be 
essentially irrational, as it is a reasonable (i.e., rational) response that results from the experience 
of trauma. There is nothing irrational about being fearful of a life threatening circumstance. On 
the other hand, I have argued that what makes PTSD a disorder is that persons with PTSD 
exhibit abnormal and irrational responses in other circumstances and that these are a source of 
explanation accounting for the disorder in PTSD patients. It follows from this that patients 
without truncations of rationality in such circumstances would not be disordered. So, I am 
arguing that PTSD, qua disorder, is essentially irrational. However, a response to Samuels’s 
reply requires a further step, as simply showing that norms of rationality are involved in the 
disorder is not enough. What needs to be shown is that norms of rationality are themselves 
sufficient to violate the mind-independence desideratum. Here is how Samuels presents this 
problem.  
                                                          
79 Samuels, forthcoming, p. 32 
80 Bremner, 2005 
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 In order for norms of rationality to challenge the natural kind thesis, Samuels argues that 
these norms must be social.81 Samuels suggests that there are alternative norms of rationality that 
are not social.82 The upshot is that rationality does not necessarily challenge the possibilty of 
understanding a mental disorder as a natural kind. The challenge from rationality is withstanding 
only on the assumption that rational norms are social norms. 
 I am willing to concede Samuels’s defense on this point, as I take no stance on whether 
norms of rationality are social norms. I will say that it seems that social practices determine what 
one ought to consider rational in at least some cases, so it would appear, prima facie, that rational 
norms are social norms. I won’t argue for this point, but consider Michael again. The reason that 
Michael’s behavior is abnormal appears, at least in part, to be due to considerations that bear 
upon his relationship to others. From the standpoint of rationality, what is normal for Michael is 
normal, relative to us. Without others to interact with, it does not matter if Michael attends a 
party. Thus, norms of rationality appear to be, at least partially, social. I am open to the 
suggestion that alternative accounts of rationality might be non-social, however. In any case, this 
problem is a much larger problem than this paper allows room to solve.  
 
Challenge Two: Suppose PTSD is a Neurobiological Disorder 
 One might be optimistic about the possibility of discovering the underlying mechanisms 
that account for the disorder known as PTSD. It would then be possible to provide a definition of 
PTSD in purely mechanistic terms, which is analogous to defining water as H20. All talk of 
rational norms could thus be avoided. Further, just as this definition of water offers reason to 
regard water as a natural kind, the same could be expected in the case of PTSD. If so, we could 
                                                          
81 Samuels, forthcoming, p. 32 - 33 
82 Samuels cites Bayesian accounts of rationality, reliabilist accounts of rationality, and pragmatic accounts of 
rationality as possible non-social alternatives.  
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salvage the claim that PTSD is a natural kind from the challenge I am presenting that concerns 
rational norms. Here I want to consider a candidate example of this kind of account.  
It may someday be possible, for example, to define PTSD as a failure of the mechanisms 
of fear extinction, where these mechanisms and the specific way in which they have failed are 
provided in the course of the definition.83 This is a promising approach to understanding this 
disorder as a natural kind, but such an approach faces challenges.  
 The first challenge to a purely reductive neurobiological account of PTSD of the kind I 
have suggested here is that such an account would still require a source of norms according to 
which PTSD qua disorder is understood. A significant challenge to achieving this task, the task 
of finding norms for neurobiology according to which one can say that PTSD is a disorder and 
that it is a natural kind, is that PTSD may be a normal response to abnormal conditions, and so 
understanding the source of disorder may not be obtainable by such an account.84 Moreover, the 
task of such an account of PTSD would be to substitute the source of normativity that I am 
suggesting rationality provides with a source of normativity applicable to neurobiological 
functions, where neurobiological functions are not subject to rational norms. One possible 
avenue to account for the normativity of biology is by appealing to evolutionary “design.”85 For 
example, one might suggest that evolution has designed the mechanisms of fear to be such that 
they are eventually extinguished via processes that can be attributed to the function of the 
                                                          
83 Garakani, Amir, Sanjay Mathew, and Dennis Charney. "Neurobiology of Anxiety Disorders and Implications for 
Treatment." The Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine 73, no. 7 (November 2006): 941-949. Dr. Kim Huhman deserves 
thanks for her insights on this point. 
84 For an account that explains PTSD as a normal response to fear, see J. Douglas Bremner, Does Stress Damage 
The Brain? (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005). Also, Rachel Yehuda and Joseph LeDoux, "Response 
Variation following Trauma: A Translational Neuroscience Approach to Understanding PTSD," Neuron 56 (2007): 
19-32. 
85 Another possible avenue is by appealing to statistical norms. There are problems with this approach as well. 
Briefly, this assumes that the majority is the norm. This requires an argument and there are likely to be numerous 
counterexamples to such an assumption. Further discussion is found in George Graham, The Disordered Mind 
(Routledge, forthcoming). 
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amygdala.86 Failure of the amygdala to perform its function can then provide an explanation of 
the disorder of PTSD.  
All of this assumes that failure of the amygdala to perform its function in the extinction 
of fear-response mechanisms is not what nature “intended.” This is not a straightforward matter 
to assume. One obstacle to this assumption is that learning that something is deadly (or some 
similar danger) confers an obvious survival advantage, which would be lost if all fear 
mechanisms were intended by nature to be eventually extinguished. Thus, understanding 
disorder by appealing to failures located in the function of biological mechanisms such as the 
amygdala, as I have quickly reviewed here, would have to explain why, for example, fear 
extinction is the norm and failure of fear extinction is outside of the norm.  
I am not suggesting that such an account is not available. What I am suggesting is that 
rationality provides a way to account for the norm violations involved in PTSD. Further, to 
account for disorders such as PTSD by appealing to violations of norms of rationality is 
consistent with locating the sources of these norm violations in mechanisms such as the 
amygdala. Furthermore, one need not recoil from such an approach due to concerns of dualistic 
anachronisms. Though it is not yet understood how rationality can result from physical sources, 
an account may be forthcoming and we can remain optimistic over the possibility of such an 
account while simultaneously endorsing the thesis that there really is such a thing as rationality 
and it is not identical to mechanisms of neurobiology. One final point is important to mention. 
Should it turn out that the disorder known as PTSD is a neurobiological disorder and that the 
disorder can be accounted for in purely reductive, mechanistic terms, it should be expected that a 
                                                          
86 Jerome Wakefield defends this kind of account. Jerome C. Wakefield, "The Concept of Disorder as a Foundation 
for the DSM's Theory-Neutral Nosology: Response to Follette and Houts, Part 2," Behavior Research and Therapy 
37 (1999): 1001-1027. Jerome C. Wakefield, "The Concept of Disorder as a Foundation for the DSM's Theory-
Neutral Nosology: Response to Follette and Houts, Part 1," Behavior Research and Therapy 37 (1999): 963-999. 
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diagnosis of this disorder no longer requires DSM criteria. Thus, in this case, PTSD should no 
longer be regarded as a mental disorder.87 
The second problem for mechanistic explanations such as those that are provided by the 
biological sciences is the “Unity Problem.”88 The Unity Problem arises from the fact that there 
are likely to be many mechanisms that account for a disorder such as PTSD. Why should these 
be treated as a set of mechanisms? Why not treat them as individual mechanisms that underlie a 
disorder? If there is nothing binding together the mechanisms, then why treat the disorder as a 
natural kind? The problem, according to Samuels, is that to understand the unification of the 
mechanisms involved in a disorder such as PTSD requires that one provide a “unifying 
characterization of the mechanism type… without merely deferring to the fact that [the 
mechanisms] produce similar effects.”89 In other words, one wants to avoid categorizing the 
mechanisms involved in PTSD by saying that they are all the same type due to their involvement 
in the disorder known as PTSD. I think the challenge to this obstacle can be overcome by better 
understanding the functions of the biological mechanisms underlying the disorder. 
For now, I maintain the position that rational norms appear to be the norms according to 
which one can understand PTSD as a disorder. Norms of rationality are not appropriate for 
natural kinds. If correct, this challenges the claim that PTSD is a natural kind, though there are 
promising programs to overcome the challenge.  
                                                          
87 I am offering an account that is provided by Graham (forthcoming). 
88 Samuels, forthcoming, p. 40 
89 Samuels, forthcoming, p. 41 
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2. The Second Problem: The Looping Effect 
At one point in time, Ian Hacking urged caution concerning natural kinds, suggesting that 
the “tradition of natural kinds” has a limited, although helpful, utility.90 One example of the 
limits of this utility applies to what Hacking calls “human kinds,” which are kinds that are 
appropriate to apply to human categories.91 Earlier, I mentioned that it might be problematic to 
consider “Fans of Miles Davis” as a natural kind. “Fans of Miles Davis” might form an example 
of a category that Hacking would call a “human kind.” In plain terms, Hacking thinks that “there 
are senses in which many of our traits of character and types of action are made up.”92 This 
much certainly seems true of “Fans of Miles Davis.” What Hacking points to here is a difference 
between natural kinds, such as water, and kinds that apply to humans, such as “Fans of Miles 
Davis.”93 According to Hacking, human kinds are created. PTSD is a category that applies to 
humans.  
 
Human Kinds and Natural Kinds 
 Hacking distinguishes human kinds from natural kinds stating, “…the histories of human 
kinds are quite different from those of natural kinds, for as some classifications are formed and 
moulded they loop back, interact with, and alter the individuals and the types of behaviour to 
                                                          
90 Hacking, 1991, p. 153 
91 Hacking has since retired the term “human kinds”: “I am glad that my (former) term ‘human kinds’ has become a 
tool with which to analyze the Us-and-them use of names for groups of people….But it is not a term that I will 
continue to use” (Ian Hacking, "Kinds of People: Moving Targets," Proceedings of the British Academy 151 (2007): 
285-318). I am going to borrow Hacking’s retired term here. I should note that this is an issue that deserves its own 
paper.  
92 Hacking, 1991, p. 152 
93 Hacking does not state explicitly a referent of “human kinds”, but in a related article writes, “When I have tried to 
indicate that there are interesting differences between ‘human kinds’ – kinds of people and their behaviour – and 
what are commonly called natural kinds, I found myself assaulted from left and right” (Ian Hacking, "A Tradition of 
Natural Kinds," Philosophical Studies, 1991: 109-126, p.109). Ignoring the assault to which Hacking refers 
(interesting as it is), the human kinds to which Hacking refers are likely to include mentally disordered humans, 
such as those with PTSD. 
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which they apply.”94 Hacking calls this phenomenon the “looping effect” (for a discussion, see 
Graham 2010). According to Hacking, the looping effect makes categories that apply to humans 
“moving targets” (Hacking, Kinds of People: Moving Targets 2007, p.293). Hacking suggests 
that natural kinds are not subject to the looping effect, whereas human kinds are. Natural kinds 
are not moving targets. 
 The looping effect is bidirectional. According to Hacking, “…our investigations interact 
with the targets themselves, and change them. And since they are changed, they are not quite the 
same kind of people as before.”95 The investigations to which Hacking refers are investigations 
such as those that occur within psychology and psychiatry. The targets of these investigations are 
the persons these investigations are concerned with. These investigations change the people and 
the people change as a result. 
 The looping effect raises an issue peculiar to mental disorders. To see this, consider a 
somatic disorder, diabetes. Merely knowing that one has diabetes does not influence the disorder. 
True, one might alter their eating habits or exercise habits and these changes can influence the 
course of the disorder; however, merely knowing one is diagnosed as diabetic is not likely to 
change the course of the disorder. Mental disorders do not appear to be immune to the looping 
effect. There is evidence that persons with PTSD are subject to the looping effect, explained 
next. 
 
Looping in PTSD 
Interpretations of the PTSD patient’s condition by the patient can influence the condition 
of the patient. Let me explain with an example. Patient debriefing immediately following the 
                                                          
94 Hacking, forthcoming, p. 153 
95 Hacking, 2007, p. 293 
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traumatic stressor is designed to gather victims together in an effort to present victims with 
information concerning the typical effects of trauma and to encourage discussion of the event 
among the victims.96 It is not clear that such debriefing programs are effective and some have 
argued that these programs may even increase the likelihood of symptom development (ibid). If 
debriefing influences the symptoms manifested by the patient, this would be an instance of the 
looping effect. Knowledge of a disorder, as prescribed by clinicians and theoreticians, influences 
the outcome of the disorder. 
If it is true that such debriefing programs are malevolent in PTSD symptom development, 
then the mind-independence desiderata is seriously challenged. Thus, PTSD is unlike many 
natural kinds that are not subject to mental influences. It is in this sense that the many character 
traits and action types of persons with PTSD may be made up in the way that Hacking describes. 
The influence of looping is not equivalent to denying that types of disorders are “real” or 
“natural.” Nonetheless, Hacking’s caution has two implications. First, the looping effect suggests 
that human kinds determine possibilities for action and this might apply in an important way to 
PTSD patients. A patient with PTSD becomes a PTSD patient, interpreted by clinicians as such, 
and the world of possibilities available to the patient is grounded upon this description. One 
theoretician offers an example of such influences: “I frequently counsel my patients not to pursue 
a career or training that requires memorization.”97 Here, patients are being told who they are and 
what they are capable of, based upon a diagnosis. This is not a criticism of clinical practices such 
as Bremner’s. I simply mention this as an example of clinician to patient influences. Second, 
PTSD patients can themselves “aim” to fit the description of the disorder, and the world that the 
                                                          
96 Herbert and Forman, forthcoming 
97 Bremner, 2005, p. 238 
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patient inhabits after the etiological event becomes the world of a PTSD patient.98 There is a 
very serious reason to consider that this might be true of PTSD patients, as I will explain next. 
 
Looping and Secondary Gain 
A wide body of literature has been motivated by the fact that PTSD patients might stand 
to benefit from financial gains resulting from their disorder.99 In fact, this was a complaint raised 
in opposition to PTSD’s inclusion in DSM-III. Moreover, DSM-IV includes a preventative 
mechanism in an effort to remedy these exact concerns.100 Potential motivation provided by 
possibility of secondary gain to fit the diagnostic category is reason enough to wonder if some 
patients have not in fact feigned the disorder, eventually becoming, in a sense, victims of the 
very disorder that they once faked – if only in their own minds.101 A more subtle motivation is 
that persons with legitimate claims to PTSD risk forfeitting financial benefits if they demonstrate 
improvement; thus, there is a motivation to self-maintain the disorder in this case as well.102 
These concerns raise serious challenges to the mind-independence desiderata, for two 
reasons. First, the data on PTSD is therefore vulnerable to contamination by false-positives 
generated by the motivations mentioned here. Thus, understanding of the disorder is also 
contaminated, which then feeds back to client interpretations. Moreover, even reductive efforts 
aimed towards seeking the causal mechanisms of this disorder run the risk of contamination by 
                                                          
98 This is closely related to numerous other issues that are prominent in the literature concerning PTSD. For 
examples of such issues with respect to narrative identity see Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Constructing the Self 
(Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2008); with respect to narration in diagnosis, Bahar 
Hashemi, Richard J. Shaw, David S. Hong, Rebecca Hall, Kristin Nelson and Hans Steiner, "Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder Following Traumatic Injury: Narratives as Unconscious Indicators of Psychopathology," Bulletin of The 
Menninger Clinic, 2008: 179-190. 
99 Loftus, Elizabeth. "The Reality of Repressed Memories." American Psychologist 48, no. 5 (May 1993): 518-537. 
100 Rosen and Taylor, 2007 
101 Ibid. Also, Elizabeth Loftus has shown that memories can be manufactured. One question to answer is whether 
such memories can result in PTSD. 
102 Freuh et al., 2007. For a response to Freuh et al., see: Brian Marx, Mark Miller, Denise Sloan, Brett Litz, Danny 
Kaloupek and Terence Keane, "Military-Related PTSD, Curent Disability Policies, and Malingering," American 
Journal of Public Health 98, no. 5 (2008): 773-774. 
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the wishes and desires of persons in these cases. The resulting risk is that the category itself is 
changed, and the patients that are diagnosed with the disorder are the ultimate victims of this 
cycle. 
A second worry is more straightforward. Patients with PTSD are aware of themselves as 
such and act accordingly. When Bremner’s patients follow his recommendation to avoid jobs 
that require memorization, they are acting as Bremner expects they should. Thus, what ought to 
be the case is determined by clinicians – clinicians impose norms that define the disorder. A 
patient with PTSD might think, “My doctor told me that I should avoid jobs that require 
memorization; thus, I won’t seek those jobs.”  
If Hacking is correct, and if I have interpreted Hacking’s caution correctly, the looping 
effect raises grave concerns over the status of PTSD as a natural kind. Natural kinds don’t 
change according to their understanding of their place in the world. Further, the looping effect in 
PTSD is an instance of rationality influencing this disorder, similar to the problem of normativity 
and rationality discussed earlier. Finally, the looping effect is also, perhaps, more subtle in its 
influence than the norms of rationality, while at the same time less likely to be avoidable. Part of 
having PTSD might be that one is susceptible to looping. 
 
3. Maybe PTSD is Not a Natural Kind, After All is Said and Done 
Evidence may ultimately support the final conclusion that rationality is simply 
indispensible to the diagnosis of PTSD, and it may be impossible to eradicate the influence of the 
looping effect. Either problem would challenge the mind-independence desiderata in ways that 
have not been discussed in the literature concerning PTSD’s status as a natural kind. What would 
be appropriate to conclude in this case? What should be said of the diagnosis? What should be 
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said of patient treatment of PTSD? These are all good questions, but here I can only supply a 
limited response, as follows. 
 First, I hope I have made it clear that discovering that PTSD is not a natural kind would 
still not entail that PTSD is not “real” or that it does not exist. Rosen and Taylor state, 
“Regardless of whether PTSD represents a distinct disorder, it has served at least one useful 
function; to promote research and advance our understanding of how individuals react to 
severely adverse events.”103 It is worth noting here that PTSD is recognizable in some persons – 
persons such as Michael – and that this is enough to get questions started.104 Recognizing PTSD 
is sufficient to serve as a diagnostic category towards which one can aim in developing and 
understanding of this disorder. Perhaps the utility of this category might be replaced by a more 
useful classification in the future, but until this occurs the status of PTSD should remain in place 
as a diagnostic category and theoretical posit. 
Second, natural kinds can be “in” a diagnosis, without a diagnosis being a natural kind.105 
It might be discovered, for example, that certain brain divisions contribute to a system of 
responses and that this system is malfunctioning in PTSD, which we currently recognize as the 
symptoms belonging to PTSD patients.106 The spirit of this kind of analysis was present when I 
discussed the role of the amygdala and mechanisms of fear extinction. There, I noted that it 
might turn out that multiple systems underlie the diagnosis, which would entail an analysis that 
breaks down the individual levels contributing to the disorder. These levels could then provide 
                                                          
103 Rosen and Taylor, 2007, p. 207 
104 For an analogous approach in emotion theory see Barrett (2006). 
105 Special thanks to Dr. George Graham for discussion on this matter, to whom I owe the point I make here. For a 
related discussion, see Robert Aunger and Valerie Curtis, "Kinds of behavior," Biology and Philosophy, 2008: 317-
345. 
106 One system that comes close to standing in for this approach is the system involving the HPA axis. See Rachel 
Yehuda, Earl L. Giller, Steven M. Southwick, Martin T. Lowy and John W. Mason, "Hypothalamic-Pituitary-
Adrenal Dysfunction in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder," Biological Psychiatry, 1991: 1031-1047. 
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reliable inductive generalizations in the way that is expected of natural kinds. An implication of 
this suggestion is worth pausing to clarify. 
 If biological mechanisms are found that underlie PTSD, does this show that PTSD is 
therefore a somatic disorder and not a mental disorder? To answer this question, consider a 
distinction, which I present through an analogy.107 Suppose I ride my bicycle through a patch of 
thorns and that this results in my bicycle tire deflating as a result of a hole. My bicycle tire would 
have a hole; my tire is disordered. But, is the tire to blame? Is this a disorder a disorder of the 
tire? No. The tire wasn’t designed to withstand the conditions it was exposed to. True, the hole is 
in the tire, but the problem is not a problem of the tire. If the problem is to be located anywhere, 
it is to be located with me, the negligent bicycle rider.  
Using this analogy, we can ask whether locating biological mechanisms responsible for 
PTSD would entail that the disorder is a somatic disorder, rather than a mental disorder. That is, 
we can ask, “If it is found that there is a circumscribed set of causal mechanisms that underlie 
PTSD, would this disorder then be a disorder of the brain, and not a mental disorder in the 
brain?”108 Perhaps. Earlier, I entertained the possibility that purely mechanistic explanations will 
account for the breakdown in rationality that appears to be present in the disorder known as 
PTSD. However, the challenges provided by such levels of analysis, like the level of explanation 
that would be provided by rationality insofar as rationality explains the norm violation and, 
therefore, the disorder of PTSD, are still outstanding. Thus, the best explanation of PTSD is one 
                                                          
107 This distinction is owed to Dr. George Graham. See George Graham, The Disordered Mind (Routledge, 
Forthcoming). 
108 George Graham makes the distinction between disorders of the brain and disorders in the brain to which I refer 
here. George Graham, The Disordered Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press , Forthcoming). 
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that suggests PTSD is a disorder in the brain and that partially accounts for the disorder by 
appealing to rationality.109  
One way to understand the biological processes and mechanisms that underlie disorders 
such as PTSD is that they provide “irruptions” of rationality.110 The biological mechanisms that 
underlie PTSD are malfunctioning in such a way as to truncate rationality, similar to the 
malfunctioning of a bicycle tire when it is run through a thorn patch. Michael’s response to his 
wife’s pleading was to stay in the car; metaphorically speaking, PTSD is a thorn in Michael 
otherwise rational thought processes. Perhaps it will be discovered that Michael’s rationality is 
truncated by a dysfunction located in the hypothalamic-pituitary axis (HPA) of Michael’s brain 
or in the amygdala, as discussed earlier.111 The HPA and the amygdala might be the natural 
kinds present in the diagnosis of PTSD, at least in Michael’s case. Whether this would be a 
sufficiently complete way to understand PTSD as a disorder, however, is not clear. Again, I flag 
it as a suggestion and as a possible area for future research. 
 
4. A Point of Caution 
The trend towards “going deeper” in an effort to discover natural kinds in mental 
phenomena might be the beginning of a discipline chasing an illusion. Seeking mechanisms such 
as those that are involved in the HPA or the amygdala are examples of this trend. Hacking warns 
of something similar when he rejects the following condition:  
Uniqueness: There is a unique best taxonomy in terms of natural kinds that represents 
nature as it is, and reflects the network of causal laws. We do not have nor could have a 
final taxonomy of anything, but any objective classification is right or wrong according 
                                                          
109 There is a significant amount of literature that speculates on the “design of the brain”, but there is not room to 
discuss this very interesting topic here. Let me just baldly state that I am skeptical of univocal explanations provided 
by evolutionary theories of functions in nature, while simultaneously a champion of such attempts. For an 
application of such an approach to PTSD, see Chris Cantor’s 2005. 
110 Graham, 2010 
111 Yehuda et al., 1991 
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as it captures part of the structure of the one true taxonomy of the universe. (Hacking, A 
Tradition of Natural Kinds 1991, p. 111) 
 
According to Hacking, the Uniqueness Condition does not make sense. Hacking rejects this 
condition for reasons that are similar to P.F. Strawson’s rejection of the notion of an exhaustive 
description.112 Hacking’s idea seems to be that there is no one “unique best taxonomy” that is 
right or wrong according to how it captures the “true” taxonomy of the universe. In other words, 
there is not a way to “carve nature at its joints” because nature does not have joints. Should one 
follow Hacking and endorse his rejection of the fourth condition quoted above? If so, perhaps the 
issue of natural kinds is not as central to PTSD as one might expect. If correct, this might apply 
just as well to all sciences. In a sense, all sciences might be made up. Perhaps there are no natural 
kinds - at least in the sense that these kinds dissect nature in such a way that one might regard 
such a dissection as capturing nature according to her natural articulations, articulations to be 
judged by nature herself. Perhaps PTSD is once such kind. I don’t mean to endorse Hacking’s 
claim, but I will say one final thing before closing. The truth, I would expect, is probably 
somewhere in the middle, between essentialism and Hacking’s skepticism over the natural kind 
thesis. 
                                                          
112 Hacking quotes Strawson, who writes in a footnote: “The idea of an ‘exhaustive description’ is quite meaningless 
in general; though meaning may be given to it in a particular context of discourse. But this is an objection I shall 
waive” (P.F. Strawson, Individuals (Routledge, 1959)). Hacking leaves out the last sentence of Strawson’s footnote. 
I am not sure that the idea of exhaustive descriptions is a meaningless one. Perhaps it is impossible, but this does not 
entail that the notion is meaningless. Whatever the case, this is beyond the scope of this paper. I take it that 
Strawson’s point is sufficient to make Hacking’s point clear enough.  
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CHAPTER 5. 
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS & SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
I began by tentatively defending the thesis that PTSD is a natural kind. My method was 
to provide a set of desiderata natural kinds should be expected to fulfill and offer reasons to 
think that PTSD can fulfill these desiderata. I then introduced two views according to which 
natural kinds might be understood, the homeostatic cluster view and essentialism. I argued that, 
if it is accepted that PTSD is a natural kind, this claim is best understood according to the 
homeostatic cluster view of natural kinds. I also defended the claim that PTSD is a natural kind 
from common criticisms, as these criticisms assume essentialism, which is an overly restrictive 
notion of natural kinds. Next, I introduced two novel challenges to the claim that PTSD is a 
natural kind. The first challenge was that norms of rationality are the appropriate norms 
according to which PTSD is best understood as a disorder, whereas paradigmatic instances of 
natural kinds (e.g., water) are not constitutively tied to norms of rationality. During this section, I 
considered the role of reductive accounts, such as those that are provided by the neurosciences, 
in understanding PTSD, suggesting that these accounts provide a promising source according to 
which we might understand natural kinds in mental disorders such as PTSD. I noted that these 
accounts also face the obstacle of finding their own source of norms. I left these accounts as open 
suggestions subject to future research. The second challenge I provided to the claim that PTSD is 
a natural kind was due to Hacking’s looping effect. It appears that PTSD is subject to change due 
to rational processes that take place in a dynamic relationship that exists between the clinician, 
researchers, and the patient, unlike what one would expect of a natural kind. I will conclude by 
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addressing a question that I have left open and by making a suggested revision to our 
understanding of PTSD. 
 
1. Diagnostic Models are not Necessarily Theoretical Models 
 I introduced an assumption early on, stating that I would follow the literature that 
criticizes this disorder in assuming that the DSM criteria are also definitional models of mental 
disorders. I want to address an important distinction that should be made between theoretical 
models and diagnostic models.  
The DSM is a diagnostic tool, not a theoretical tool. Thus the efficacy of the DSM criteria 
should be judged according to its utility in clinical contexts, not according to its theoretical 
utility. I have not attempted to provide an analysis of the DSM’s efficacy with respect to PTSD 
within clinical contexts in this essay. My concern has been to address whether PTSD should be 
considered a natural kind. Natural kinds are theoretical tools. The utility of a theoretical tool is 
not the same as the utility of a diagnostic tool. Arguments that deny PTSD is a natural kind 
according to DSM criterion are aimed at a theoretical concept but are based on clinical criteria. 
These arguments should address this distinction, at the very least. At the very worst, they are 
simply bad arguments. 
The clinical criteria and the theoretical entities that the criteria are intended to pick out 
would ideally be co-extensional. It is not clear that this is where things currently stand with 
respect to the DSM criteria of PTSD.113 This is the problem with understanding PTSD as a 
                                                          
113 For an exchange related to this matter, see William C. Follette and Arthur C. Houts, "Models of Scientific 
Progress and the Role of Theory in Taxonomy Development: A Case Study of the DSM," Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology 64, no. 6 (1996): 1120-1132.); for a reply, Jerome C. Wakefield, "The Concept of Disorder as a 
Foundation for the DSM's Theory-Neutral Nosology: Response to Follette and Houts, Part 1," Behavior Research 
and Therapy 37 (1999): 963-999. Also, Jerome C. Wakefield, "The Concept of Disorder as a Foundation for the 
DSM's Theory-Neutral Nosology: Response to Follette and Houts, Part 2," Behavior Research and Therapy 37 
(1999): 1001-1027. 
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natural kind according to the DSM criteria. If we are to understand PTSD as a natural kind, this 
should be according to a theoretical model.  
The search for natural kinds within psychiatry and psychology can begin with DSM 
criteria, but this is not where they must end. Just as water was once identified by its surface 
features, so too can psychiatric kinds be initially identifed by their surface features, where the 
DSM provides a model of these features by offering the symptomatic criteria of mental 
disorders. The theoretical problems that are inhereted by the DSM criteria, however, would be 
mitigated by adopting models that are more useful within theoretical contexts.114 In other words, 
keeping the distinction between theoretical models and clinical models is the best way towards 
progress. This would provide a number of advantages. 
First, the research programs that are guided by theoretical models could evolve without 
having necessary patient treatment implications. Clinicians would, therefore, be free to use 
whatever tools were most helpful in assisting patients without being tacitly tied to a theoretical 
commitment contained in the DSM.115 I believe that this could remedy some, but not all, 
concerns that are invited by the looping effect. Briefly, making theoretical models distinct from 
clinical models might provide a barrier between theoretical and clinical practices. True, the 
influences of looping would still be present in patient and clinician relations, but the theoretical 
implications might be mitigated. This, of course, is a proposal and claim that calls for further 
development. 
Second, theoretical models can be used to search for more basic laws to underwrite the 
classifications of DSM. Recall that not everyone gets PTSD after a traumatic experience and that 
                                                          
114 For an example of a theoretical model of PTSD that I think is promising, see: David Rubin, Dorthe Berntsen and 
Malene Klindt Bohni, "A Memory-Based Model of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Evaluating Basic Assumptions 
Underlying the PTSD Diagnosis," Psychological Review 115, no. 4 (2008): 985-1011. 
115 For a statement of these kinds of concerns within the development of DSM see William C. Follette and Arthur C. 
Houts, "Models of Scientific Progress and the Role of Theory in Taxonomy Development: A Case Study of the 
DSM," Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 64, no. 6 (1996): 1120-1132. 
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the stress response of PTSD is possibly a normal response to abnormal conditions, where the 
disorder comes from a failure to extinguish fear. Diagnostically, this seems important. Some 
persons may show PTSD symptoms and then overcome the disorder. As it stands, there is a 
separate category within the DSM to account for these kinds of cases (Acute Stress Disorder).116 
Theoretically, however, this distinction may not be important. It might be that persons in this 
circumstance are identical to persons that have experienced a traumatic event and failed to 
recover - identical, perhaps, from a neurobiological standpoint. The mechanisms shared by each 
clinical group might account for the similarities across these patients manifesting the symptoms 
of PTSD. In other words, the utility of separate categories may serve a clinical function, whereas 
reality is not reflected by these category distinctions.  
Carl Hempel, a influential figure in the current DSM design, suggested that theoretical 
progress entailed a reduction of categorization. As theories are developed that can account for a 
variety of phenomenon according to increasingly general laws, the number of categories required 
to explain the observable phenomenon should diminish.117 Call this Hempel’s thesis. My 
suggestion is consistent with Hempel’s thesis, and I will assume Hempel’s thesis is consistent 
with the aims of DSM and that it is true. What I am suggesting is that seeking neurobiological 
mechanisms that explain mental disorders can lead to natural kinds that are relevant to those 
disorders. Thus, we can take the theoretical weight off of the DSM criteria. The mechanisms 
relevant to understanding disorders such as PTSD are likely to apply to other disorders that are 
similar to PTSD.118 Here, the categories are reduced in number without assuming that the 
                                                          
116 Laura E. Gibson, Acute Stress Disorder, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, 
ww.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/ncdocs/fact_shts/fs_asd (accessed March 21, 2009). 
117 Follette, William C., and Arthur C. Houts. "Models of Scientific Progress and the Role of Theory in Taxonomy 
Development: A Case Study of the DSM." Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 64, no. 6 (1996): 1120-
1132. 
118 I think my recommendation is similar in spirit to Bremner’s recommendation that there be a new category of 
“trauma-spectrum disorders”, although Bremner’s recommendation is not consistent with Hempel’s thesis. 
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categories within the DSM must also reduce. I think that this is what we should aim for and hope 
for. 
So, is PTSD a natural kind? Not if what I have argued is correct. Is it a real disorder? 
Yes. How should this disorder be understood? By developing theoretical models that can account 
for the puzzling features that bring controversy to this diagnosis. Are natural kinds relevant to the 
disorder? Yes, and perhaps they can be at a reductive level, such as those that are provided by 
neurobiology and the neurosciences. Is it best, therefore, to expect that one day it will be most 
appropriate to regard PTSD as a neurological disorder, rather than a mental disorder? Not if 
PTSD is subject to norms of rationality and the looping effect. Thus, there is a significant amount 
of both clinical and theoretical work that is outstanding with respect to this disorder. 
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